==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 1 of 11 Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXI Index ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ November 4, 1988 Welcome to Phrack Inc. Issue XXI. So far, we've been relatively productive in getting files and getting issues together for the future. If you would like to contribute a file for Phrack Inc., please contact The Mentor or Epsilon and they will forward the files to us, or if you are on any of the connecting networks, send mail and/or files to Taran King's address: C488869@UMCVMB.BITNET. We are pleased to introduce a trilogy pertaining to the security of the phreak/hack community and various aspects thereof. The first file, "Shadows Of A Future Past" and the next two files will be in the next two issues, so be watching for those. It's great to be "back." Taran King & Knight Lightning =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This issue contains the following files; 1. Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning 2. Phrack Pro-Phile on Modem Master by Taran King 3. Shadows Of A Future Past (Part 1 of the Vicious Circle Trilogy) by KL 4. The Tele-Pages by Jester Sluggo 5. Satellite Communications by Scott Holiday 6. Network Management Center by Knight Lightning and Taran King 7. Non-Published Numbers by Patrick Townsend 8. Blocking Of Long Distance Calls by Jim Schmickley 9. Phrack World News Special Edition II by Knight Lightning 10. Phrack World News Issue XXI Part 1 by Knight Lightning and Epsilon 11. Phrack World News Issue XXI Part 2 by Knight Lightning and Epsilon _______________________________________________________________________________ ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 2 of 11 == Phrack Pro-Phile XXI == The Phrack Pro-Phile's purpose is to present to the reader profiles of older or influential hackers or phreakers that have or do exist. This month's Pro-Phile features a user of past days...Modem Master, a.k.a. Napoleon Solo. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Personal Information ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Handle: Napolean Solo Call me: Scott Past Handle: Modem Master Handle Origin: I used to be a real "Man from UNCLE" fan D.O.Birth: March 29, 1970 Current Age: 18 yrs. Height: 6'0" Weight: 207 lbs Eyes: Hazel Hair: Light Brown Computers: Apple //+, Apple //gs, normal extra hardware, 2400 baud modem - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I started on my way to hackerdom in early 1983 when I bought my first modem, a Networker 300 baud (What a gem!!) to use in my Apple II+. I asked the salesperson for the numbers of the local boards (at the time there were a whole 3 here, and one was an IBM users group board). Well, it just so happened one was an Apple board run on an old version of Networks II, with a sysop who had been known to rip off a local extender here and there. After chatting with him for a while he realized I was one of those eager-to-learn Jr. High kids, so he put me in touch with several other users of his board. Well, one of those was Simon Templar, who would later be the sysop of the Pearly Gates, and I guess to me, about as close a friend a phreak can have that lives 1000 miles a way. Simon gave me my first code (to an 800 number owned by LDX), and the numbers of some boards where I might pick up some more additional knowledge (IC's Socket, AT&T Phone Center, and Sherwood Forest). Well, after pestering just about anybody that seemed to know ANYTHING, I was on my way. Soon, I was frequenting at least one board in almost every area code. I also learned the advantage of scanning exchanges, I found several local PBXes and a Sprint indial that nobody seemed to known about. That facilitated my "habit" even more and I then found a little Diversi-Dial dubbed "Beandial." That was where I really got off the ground. It was frequented by many knowledgeable phreaks, so between that and all of the BBSes I was on, I had a wealth of knowledge to look to all at my fingertips when I had a question. Beandial also left me with several good friends, the most notable being Lord Kahz. It also put me in touch with someone rather well known, King Blotto (you should have seen my face the night my phone rang and the guy at the other end said "Hi, this is King Blotto, wanna be on my board?" and gave me the number!). As of the last several years, I have left the mainstream phreaking life, and only look in once in a while through past friends. That may change now, as Taran King and Knight Lightning have shown me that there are in fact TRUE phreaks left. I was beginning to doubt it, hence my absence. Memorable bulletin boards that I have been on include; The Pearly Gates, AT&T Phone Center, Blottoland (even though I was only actually on during the last phase of its life), and Bean Dial, plus all the normal ones that everybody and his brother were on. Currently I am enrolled at North Dakota State University, majoring in computer engineering. I work at McDonalds flippin' dem burgers. Regrets ~~~~~~~ I regret leaving the phreak world in the first place, I was disillusioned with all the little nerds with computers and modems who thought they were phreaks just because some dork they knew gave them a code. Favorite Things ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Chicks: The ones with really big... uh.. Brains! Thats it! Ya know, they stick out their bras.. Uh.. I mean their intelligence protrudes!! Ya! thats it! People: I like just about anybody who has something interesting and meaningful to talk about (and chicks with big ****) Music: 70's music like Led Zeppelin, and most heavy metal bands. I also can go for top 40 as long as we aren't talking Whitney, or Jackson, or G. Michael or some other puke like that. Most Memorable Experiences ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The time me and a friend from Idaho called this local guy who THOUGHT he was a phreak. I talked to him on one line, while MIKE talked to him long distance on another, convincing him that AT&T security had really busted his ass. I've never heard ANYONE sound so scared in my life! HAHAH Starting on my high school's varsity football team for two years instead of the average 0-1 yr. Some people to mention ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lord Kahz Cookie Cruncher Android Base -- for pointing me in the right direction Simon Templar -- for taking that direction and showing me what to do with it. All others who have helped me in anyway, whether it be questions I had, or whatever else... Thanks. Inside Joke ~~~~~~~~~~~ To Kahz: "Hey MM, let's call Mari!" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Serious Section ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I think people who abuse CCs are assholes. That does nothing but hurt all of us; all that comes out of it is one person's gain and many people's suffering. Example; Sysops of the board where the inevitably BUSTED asshole posted his CC numbers. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Although he has never met any hackers, Scott feels that there are a few geeks out there based on some of his phone conversations. Thanks for your time Scott. Taran King ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 3 of 11 <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> <> <> <> Shadows Of A Future Past <> <> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <> <> Part One Of The Vicious Circle Trilogy <> <> <> <> A New Indepth Look At A Re-Occurring Problem <> <> by Knight Lightning <> <> <> <> August 6, 1988 <> <> <> <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> The Problem? ~~~~~~~~~~~~ The fate of the entire modem community for the most part is based on the foundation of computer bulletin boards. These realms of information exchange have become centers of learning and trading various information for thousands of hackers across the United States and even the world. However, today's security consultants and law enforcement agencies are smarter than ever too and they know where to strike in order to do the most damage. The concept of creating a bulletin board for the purpose of catching hackers was unheard of until The Phoenix Phortress Incident of 1986. The creation of this bulletin board system enabled Sergeant Dan Pasquale of the Fremont Police Department the ability to penetrate the sacred barrier between the phreak/hack community and the rest of the world. This file will attempt to show the extent of this problem within the community and hopefully will lead readers to discover ways of protecting themselves from the many "venus fly traps" they are likely to encounter. Articles presented in this file are specially edited reprints from past issues of Phrack World News. The Evidence - The unseen truths reside in the shadows of our past and future. ~~~~~~~~~~~~ The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue III; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Phoenix Phortress Stings 7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ On March 5, 1986, the following seven phreaks were arrested in what has come to be known as the first computer crime "sting" operation. Captain Hacker \ Doctor Bob \ Lasertech \ The Adventurer The Highwayman \ The Punisher \ The Warden Many of them or other members of Phoenix Phortress belonged to these groups: High Mountain Hackers \ Kaos Inc. \ Shadow Brotherhood \ The Nihilist Order Of the seven, three were 15 years old; two were 16; one was 17; and one, 19. Their charges include: Several misdemeanors Trafficking in stolen long distance service codes Trafficking in stolen credit card numbers Possession of stolen property Possession of dangerous weapons (a martial arts weapon) Charging mail-order merchandise to stolen credit card numbers Selling stolen property Charging calls internationally to telephone service numbers Other phreak boards mentioned include: Bank Vault (Mainly for credit card numbers and tips on credit card scams) Phreakers Phortress (Mainly of course for phreak codes and other information) After serving search warrants early Wednesday morning on the seven Fremont residences where the young men lived with their parents, police confiscated at least $12,000 worth of equipment such as computers, modems, monitors, floppy disks, and manuals, which contained information ranging from how to make a bomb, to the access codes for the Merrill Lynch and Dean Witter Financial Services Firm's corporate computers. The sysop of Phoenix Phortress was The Revenger, who was supposedly Wally Richards, a 25 year-old Hayward man who "phreaked back east a little" in New Jersey. He took the phone number under the name of Al Davis. However he was really Sgt. Daniel Pasquale of the Fremont Police Department. When he introduced his board to other computer users, he called it the "newest, coolest, phreak board in town." Pasquale said he got the idea for the sting operation after a 16-year old arrested last summer for possession of stolen property "rolled them over (narced) He told us all about their operation." Pasquale used a police department Apple //e computer and equipment, with access codes and information provided by eight corporations, including Wells Fargo Bank, Sprint, and MCI. Pasquale said he received more than 2,500 calls from about 130 regular users around the country. The police started to make their first case three days after the board went up. "We had taken the unlisted phone number under the name Al Davis," Pasquale said. "In six days, these kids had the name on the bulletin board. I would have needed a search warrant to get that information." The arrests were made after five months of investigation by Dan Pasquale. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Phoenix Phortress incident only led to the arrest of seven hackers. However, at the same time it enabled the law enforcement agencies to gather information about over one hundred other hackers, systems being discussed, anything transmitted in electronic mail on the bulletin board, and most likely gave them information about hundreds of other hackers, bulletin boards, and so forth. The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue VII; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Maxfield Strikes Again August 20, 1986 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Many of you probably remember a system known as "THE BOARD" in the Detroit 313 NPA. The number was 313-592-4143 and the newuser password was "HEL-N555,ELITE,3" (then return). It was kind of unique because it was run off of an HP2000 computer. On August 20, 1986 the following messages began to appear on THE BOARD; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Welcome to MIKE WENDLAND'S I-TEAM sting board! (Computer Services Provided By BOARDSCAN) 66 Megabytes Strong 300/1200 baud - 24 hours. Three (3) lines = no busy signals! Rotary hunting on 313-534-0400. Board: General Information & BBS's Message: 41 Title: YOU'VE BEEN HAD!!! To: ALL From: HIGH TECH Posted: 8/20/86 @ 12.08 hours Greetings: You are now on THE BOARD, a "sting" BBS operated by MIKE WENDLAND of the WDIV-TV I-Team. The purpose? To demonstrate and document the extent of criminal and potentially illegal hacking and telephone fraud activity by the so-called "hacking community." Thanks for your cooperation. In the past month and a half, we've received all sorts of information from you implicating many of you to credit card fraud, telephone billing fraud, vandalism, and possible break-ins to government or public safety computers. And the beauty of this is we have your posts, your E-Mail and--- most importantly ---your REAL names and addresses. What are we going to do with it? Stay tuned to News 4. I plan a special series of reports about our experiences with THE BOARD, which saw users check in from coast-to-coast and Canada, users ranging in age from 12 to 48. For our regular users, I have been known as High Tech, among other ID's. John Maxfield of Boardscan served as our consultant and provided the HP2000 that this "sting" ran on. Through call forwarding and other conveniences made possible by telephone technology, the BBS operated remotely here in the Detroit area. When will our reports be ready? In a few weeks. We now will be contacting many of you directly, talking with law enforcement and security agents from credit card companies and the telephone services. It should be a hell of a series. Thanks for your help. And don't bother trying any harassment. Remember, we've got YOUR real names. Mike Wendland The I-team WDIV, Detroit, MI. Board: General Information & BBS's Message: 42 Title: BOARDSCAN To: ALL From: THE REAPER This is John Maxfield of Boardscan. Welcome! Please address all letter bombs to Mike Wendland at WDIV-TV Detroit. This board was his idea. The Reaper (a.k.a. Cable Pair) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Maxfield was in general extremely proud of his efforts with THE BOARD and he said that a lot of the people he voice verified should have known it was him. According to John Maxfield, the only reason this sting board was put up was to show "What is currently happening in the phreak/hack community." He said no legal action will be taken at all, and besides, its fattened his "dossiers" on a lot of people! [The news stories for WDIV-TV 4 appeared in Phrack World News Issue IX.] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Now, this is a classic example of people not learning from other people's mistakes. At some point in time prior to this incident, the number for THE BOARD was posted, it was given a lot of hype and eventually it drew in hackers to THE BOARD like flies to a spider web from which the unsuspecting users never broke free. That is the point I am trying to make -- today's phreak/hacker must learn to be more security conscious. What makes anyone think that they can trust someone just because they are running a bulletin board? This blind faith is what will be the downfall of many a hacker until they wise up and start paying attention to what they are doing. Safety first; the stakes in this game are a lot higher than no television after school for a week because once a hacker's phone number falls into the wrong hands, the law enforcement community or organizations like the Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) can find out everything about you. I know because I have seen their files and their hacker data base is so incredibly large and accurate...its unbelievable. The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue XIV; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Metalland South: Phreak BBS or MetaliFEDS Inc.? June 2, 1987 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Metalland South BBS, at 404-327-2327, was once a fairly well known bulletin board, where many respected members of the hack/phreak community resided. It was originally operated by two guys from Metal Communications, Inc., but it wasn't an MCI club board. The sysop was Iron Man and the co-sysop was Black Lord. Recently, it has come to the writer's attention, that MLS has come under new management, new policies, and possibly a new idea; Sting. Somewhere around September-October 1986, Iron Man removed all of the hack/ phreak related subboards as well as all G-philes from the system. He was apparently worried about getting busted. The last time this reporter spoke with him, Iron Man said he intended to put the hack/phreak subs back up. Then, not long after this conversation, the number was changed (The original number was 404-576-5166). A person using the alias of The Caretaker was made co-sysop and Iron Man would not reply to feedback. Everything was handled by The Caretaker [TC from now on]. TC did not allow any hack/phreak subs, but said he would put them up if the users would follow STRICT validation procedures. Strict validation on MLS includes: ^*^ Your Real Name ^*^ Your Address ^*^ Your Voice Phone Number ^*^ A Self-Addressed Envelope (in which he will send back with your account number and password.) It is obvious to see the ramifications here. A board or sysop gets busted and then makes a deal to turn over the board to some company or agency. To make sure that they get who they want, you have to give them all this info, and the only you can get a password is to let them mail it to you, thus guaranteeing that if something illegal is posted under that account, you are responsible, no ifs, ands, or buts. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - There was more information that went on to prove that Metalland South was indeed some kind of a trap or sting board and the whole aura of mystery surrounding this system made it not worth calling. Do not EVER give a sysop your address so he can send you your password. There is no need for such information as it can only hurt you severely and would not benefit the sysop in any way that would leave you unharmed. One other item concerning bulletin boards comes from PWN Issue V where mention of yet another hacker sting board named The Tunnel was discovered in Texas. And lets not forget about TMC's P-80, sysoped by Scan Man, that was responsible for the apprehension of Shawn of Phreakers Quest (also known as Capt. Caveman). However, do not fool yourself into believing that bulletin boards are the only places you are likely to run into trouble. Regular systems that you like to work with may be just as dangerous if you are not careful. Druidic Death and Celtic Phrost found this out the hard way on the Unix system at MIT as they nearly succumbed to the power of progressive entrapment which would have doomed them both. The following is an excerpt from Phrack World News Issue XI; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MIT Unix: Victim or Aggressor? January 23 - February 2, 1987 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Was the MIT system an innocent victim of hacker oppression or simply another trap to capture unsuspecting hackers in the act? It all started like this... [Some posts have been slightly edited to be relevant to the topic] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ MIT Name: Druidic Death Date: 12:49 am Mon Jan 20, 1986 Lately I've been messing around on MIT's VAX in there Physics Department. Recently some one else got on there and did some damage to files. However MIT told me that they'll still trust us to call them. The number is: 617-253-XXXX We have to agree to the following or we will be kicked off, they will create a "hacker" account for us. <1> Use only GUEST, RODNEY, and GAMES. No other accounts until the hacker one is made. There are no passwords on these accounts. <2> Make sure we log off properly. Control-D. This is a UNIX system. <3> Not to call between 9 AM and 5 PM Eastern Standard Time. This is to avoid tying up the system. <4> Leave mail to GEORGE only with UNIX questions (or C). And leave our handles so he'll know who we are. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Unix Name: Celtic Phrost Date: 4:16 pm Mon Jan 20, 1986 Thanks Death for the MIT computer, I've been working on getting into them for weeks. Here's another you can play around with: 617/258-XXXX login:GUEST Or use a WHO command at the logon to see other accounts, it has been a long time since I played with that system, so I am unsure if the GUEST account still works, but if you use the WHO command you should see the GUEST account needed for applying for your own account. -Phrost ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Unix Name: Celtic Phrost Date: 5:35 pm Mon Jan 20, 1986 Ok, sorry, but I just remembered the application account, its: OPEN Gawd, I am glad I got that off my chest! -(A relieved)Celtic Phrost. Also on that MIT computer Death listed, some other default accounts are: LONG MIKE GREG NEIL DAN Get the rest yourself, and please people, LEAVE THEM UNPASSWORDED! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ MIT Name: Druidic Death 12 Date: 1:16 am Fri Jan 23, 1987 MIT is pretty cool. If you haven't called yet, try it out. Just PLEASE make sure you follow the little rules they asked us about! If someone doesn't do something right the sysop leaves the gripe mail to me. Check out my directory under the guest account just type "cd Dru". Read the first file. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ MIT Name: Ctrl C Date: 12:56 pm Sat Jan 24, 1987 MIT Un-Passworded Unix Accounts: 617-253-XXXX ALEX BILL GAMES DAVE GUEST DAN GREG MIKE LONG NEIL TOM TED BRIAN RODNEY VRET GENTILE ROCKY SPIKE KEVIN KRIS TIM And PLEASE don't change the Passwords.... -=>Ctrl C<=- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ MIT Again Name: Druidic Death Date: 1:00 pm Wed Jan 28, 1987 Ok people, MIT is pissed, someone hasn't been keeping the bargain and they aren't too thrilled about it. There were only three things they asked us to do, and they were reasonable too. All they wanted was for us to not compromise the security much more than we had already, logoff properly, not leave any processes going, and call only during non-business hours, and we would be able to use the GUEST accounts as much as we like. Someone got real nice and added themselves to the "daemon" group which is superusers only, the name was "celtic". Gee, I wonder who that could have been? I'm not pissed at anyone, but I'd like to keep on using MIT's computers, and they'd love for us to be on, but they're getting paranoid. Whoever is calling besides me, be cool ok? They even gave me a voice phone to chat with their sysops with. How often do you see this happen? A little perturbed but not pissed... DRU' ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Tsk, Celtic. Name: Evil Jay Date: 9:39 am Thu Jan 29, 1987 Well, personally I don't know why anyone would want to be a superuser on the system in question. Once you've been on once, there is really nothing that interesting to look at...but anyway. -EJ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ In trouble again... Name: Celtic Phrost Date: 2:35 pm Fri Jan 30, 1987 ...I was framed!! I did not add myself to any "daemon" group on any MIT UNIX. I did call once, and I must admit I did hang up without logging off, but this was due to a faulty program that would NOT allow me to break out of it, no matter what I tried. I am sure that I didn't cause any damage by that. -Phrost ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Major Problems Name: Druidic Death Date: 12:20 pm Sat Jan 31, 1987 OK, major stuff going down. Some unidentified individual logged into the Physics Dept's PDP11/34 at 617-253-XXXX and was drastically violating the "agreement" we had reached. I was the one that made the "deal" with them. And they even gave me a voice line to talk to them with. Well, one day I called the other Physics computer, the office AT and discovered that someone created an account in the superuser DAEMON group called "celtic". Well, I was contacted by Brian through a chat and he told me to call him. Then he proceeded to nicely inform me that "due to unauthorized abuse of the system, the deal is off". He was cool about it and said he wished he didn't have to do that. Then I called George, the guy that made the deal and he said that someone who said he was "Celtic Phrost" went on to the system and deleted nearly a year's worth of artificial intelligence data from the nuclear fission research base. Needless to say I was shocked. I said that he can't believe that it was one of us, that as far as I knew everyone was keeping the deal. Then he (quite pissed off) said that he wanted all of our names so he can report us to the FBI. He called us fags, and all sorts of stuff, he was VERY!! [underline twice] PISSED! I don't blame him. Actually I'm not blaming Celtic Phrost, it very easily could have been a frame up. But another thing is George thinks that Celtic Phrost and Druidic Death are one and the same, in other words, he thinks that *I* stabbed him in the back. Basically he just doesn't understand the way the hacker community operates. Well, the deal is off, they plan to prosecute whoever they can catch. Since George is my best friend's brother I have not only lost a friend, but I'm likely to see some legal problems soon. Also, I can forget about doing my graduate work at MIT. Whoever did this damage to them, I hope you're happy. You really messed things up real nice for a lot of people. Celtic, I don't have any reason to believe you messed with them. I also have no reason to think you didn't. I'm not making an accusation against you, but WHOEVER did this, deserves to be shot as far as I'm concerned. Until this data was lost, they were on the verge of harnessing a laser-lithium produced form of nuclear fission that would have been more efficient than using the standard hydrogen. Well, back to the drawing board now. I realize that it's hard to believe that they would have data like this on this system. But they were quite stupid in many other areas too. Leaving the superuser account with no password?? Think about it. It's also possible that they were exaggerating. But regardless, damage seems to have been done. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ MIT Name: Phreakenstein Date: 1:31 am Sun Feb 01, 1987 Heck! I dunno, but whoever it was, I think, should let himself (the s00per K-rad elyte d00d he is) be known. I wasn't on MIT, but it was pretty dumb of MIT to even let Hackers on. I wouldn't really worry though, they did let you on, and all you have to prove is that you had no reason to do it. ----Phreak ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I wonder... Name: Ax Murderer 15 Date: 6:43 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987 I highly doubt that is was someone on this system. Since this is an elite board, I think all the users are pretty decent and know right and wrong things to do. Could be that one of the users on this system called another system and gave it out!?? Ax Murderer ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ It was stupid Name: Druidic Death 12 Date: 9:21 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987 It seems to me, or, what I gathered, they felt that there were going to be hackers on the system to begin with and that this way they could keep themselves basically safe. I doubt that it was Celtic Phrost, I don't think he'd be an asshole like that. But I can't say. When I posted, I was pretty pissed about the whole deal. I've calmed down now. Psychic Warlord said something to me voice the other day that made me stop and think. What if this was a set up right from the start? I mean, MIT won't give me specifics on just what supposedly happened, Celtic Phrost denies everything, and the biggest part of it is what George said to me. "We can forgive you for what you did to us if you'll promise to go straight and never do this again and just tell us who all of your friends are that are on the system". I didn't pay much attention to that remark at first, now I'm beginning to wonder... I, of course, didn't narc on anyone. (Who do I know??? hehe) DRU' ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Comments... Name: Delta-Master Date: 7:15 am Mon Feb 02, 1987 It wouldn't surprise me if it was some kind of setup, it's been done before. Delta-Master [All posts in this article were taken from ShadowSpawn.] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Solution ~~~~~~~~~~~~ What more is there to say? It definitely looks like there was a setup involved and it probably was not the first time and probably will not be the last time either. So how can you protect yourself? As far as the bulletin boards go. There is an unwritten rule somewhere that basically says that to be a good sysop, you first have to be a good user. If the sysop of some mystery board is not someone you have seen around for a long time, then I would not call. However, even if it is someone who has been around, references from someone you feel you can trust is a necessity. It all boils down to the reliability of the information and the persons involved. When dealing with systems like the MIT Unix, remember, if its too good to be true then most likely there will be something that you are not being told. Who in their right mind is going to give free accounts to an important system with delicate information to a group of hackers? Its crazy. This file will hopefully serve as an informative fresh look at an old game. To me, even if the time I spent putting this article together helps out or saves only one phreak/hacker, I feel my job has been done successfully. :Knight Lightning "The Future Is Forever" The Phoenix Project =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 4 of 11 :.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: :.:.: :.:.: :.: The Tele-Pages :.: :.: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ :.: :.: Telenet Nodes/Addresses :.: :.: :.: :.: Collected by Anonymous Sources :.: :.: :.: :.: From Europe, United Kingdom, and The Middle East :.: :.: :.: :.: Imported into the USA by Jester Sluggo :.: :.: :.: :.: Special Thanks To Sefi :.: :.: :.: :.: October 7, 1988 :.: :.:.: :.:.: :.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: This file contains the list of Telenet nodes/addresses you use when you are outside of USA/Canada (Example: United Kingdom, Europe, or the Middle East). Very much 'thanks' goes towards the wonderful, people who worked infinite-months on this. -- Sluggo !! (* = Passwords that have been removed for this presentation. - KL) _____________________________________________________________________________ | | | | | | | | | Name |Number |Ext.|User Name |Password |KN|DN|NO|Test|Land| ============================================================================== Us Telemail |031102020014 | |KKCHUNG |******** | |XX| | | US | Uni Brighton |023427050015 | |GUEST |******* | |XX| | | UK | Sysnet Wien |023224221142 |MAI |Gast |**** | |XX| | | AT | |023424126010604 |,5020015 |*****/*****| |XX| | | UK | |026243221093001 |U 5Jm11964,|***** | |XX| | | | |03422351919169 |,10404000 |******( *x)| |XX| | | | Z E V |022847911118 | |EPSON |***** | |XX| | | CH | Altos | 45890040004 | |Woodo |****(***** | |XX| | | DE | Mehlbox HAM | 45400090184 | |Mike |****** | |XX| | | DE | E C H O | 0270448112 | |UK85041D |******** |XX| | | | NE | Eis - Vax |???????????? | |????????????|???????????|??|??|??|????|????| B I X |031060057878 | |Rupert |-----------| | | | | US | C.L.I.N.C.H. | 4440009031 | |Gast |**** | | | | | DE | | 45690090125 | |KO/VMUTIL |****** | |XX| | | DE | E X C O N |022849911102001 |Call 130 |*** | |XX| | | CH | |023422351919169 |,49000001 |*******/**** |XX| | | UK | R M I Aachen | 45241090832 | |Guest (Menue 20.3) *****| | | | | DE | Markt & Tech. | 45890010006 | |EMERY04 |???????????|XX| | | | DE | Markt & Tech. | 45890010006 | |EMERY05 |???????????| |XX| | | DE | K D D Vax | 0440820023 | |Conf |**** | |XX| | | JA | Emery ADO | 03106907626 | |CICS4\D |***** | | | | | US | Euronet | 023421920100513 |Tikatom | | |XX| | | NE | Netztest DE | 4590049002 |ECHO| | | | | | | DE | Netztest AU | 05053210001 | | | | | | | | AU | The Source |0311030100038| |Jinatari |********* | | | |DEMO| US | The Source |0311030100038| |Josh1 |******** | |XX| | | US | Delphi |0311061703088| |------------|-----------| | | | | US | Nuclear Res. | 03110500061 | |Bill |******* | |XX| | | US | E.S.A. |023421920115600 |MAR15540 | | |XX| | | NE | Hazylab | 45400030201 | |User |**** | |XX| | | DE | |023421880100300 |Mudguest |******** | |XX| |18-8| NE | | 4511042301 | |zzve099/zzueb|******/******* | | | DE | Datapac | 030292100086| |------------|-----------| | | | | CA | Dallas | 0310600787 | |------------|-----------| | | | | US | A M P |023422020010700 |Use Demo Account | | | | | UK | Canada |0302067100901| |------------|-----------| | | | | CA | Telenet |0311020200141| |Telemailintl|**** ******| |XX| | | US | A D P Network |034219200118 | |1300-7777 |*** | |XX| | | NE | Hostess |023421920101013 |Euonet |***** | |XX| | | NE | G D P T T |02284410906 | |mit \G Laeuten NUA *****| | | | | IT | Tymnet |4561040250 | | | | | | | | DE | Autonet |45611040076 | | | | | | | | DE | PSS DOC |02421920101013 | | | | | | | | Midnet Gatew. |0234260227227| | | | | | | | UK | NUMAC |0234263259159| | | | | | | | UK | Sharp Comp. |0234219200203| |,IPSHIP | | | | | | UK | College LON |0234219200333| |,EUCLID | | | | | | UK | Brit. TELECOM |023421920101030 |,TSTB | | | | | | UK | Phis. Labtory |0234219709111| |,NPL1 | | | | | | UK | Phis. Labtory |0234219709210| |,NPL2 | | | | | | UK | Queen Marry C.|023419806160 | |,QMC | | | | | | UK | Atom.Ener.Res.|0234223519111| |,AERE | | | | | | UK | Database |023422351911198 |,DAADA | | | | | | UK | Uni Leverpool |0234251248248| |,LIVE | | | | | | UK | Space Research|0234290524242| |,RSRERADIO | | | | | | UK | Brit. Oxig. |0234293212212| |,BOC | | | | | | UK | A M D A H L |0240515330 | |,QZIBQZ | | | | | | | Cyber |02405015320 | |,OZCBQZ | | | | | | | H M I | 45300217 | |,HMI | | | | | | DE | S W |02405020328 | |,QZXAQZ via reverse Pad| | | | | | PSS Mail Serv |023421920105 | | | | | | | | UK | C E R N |022846811405 | | | | | | | | | W A X Bank FRA| 45611040187| |????????????|???????????| | | | | DE | Uni Bochum | 45611040240| | | | | | | | DE | Uni Berlin | 4530040023 | | | | | | | | DE | Teleprint SBR | 4568100010 | | | | | | | | DE | Max Planc MUC | 45890040220| | | | | | | | DE | B B D A |02062221006 | | | | | | | | | Dialne |0234212300120| | | | | | | | UK | Euclid LON |0234219200333| | | | | | | | UK | Decates | 44615440371 | | | | | | | | DE | R M I Aachen | 44241040341 | | | | | | | | DE | N P L I |0234219709111| | | | | | | | UK | T S T B |023421920101030 | | | | | | | UK | U C L |0234219200300| | | | | | | | UK | Dimdi |45221040006 | |,DA | | | | | | DE | Dimdi |45221040104 | |,DA | | | | | | DE | Emery STR |4471149236 | | | | | | | | DE | |07222211100171 | | | | | | | | |43221093001 | |U5JM11964,***** | | | | | DE | |02222632004 | |ask reply for some NUA's| | | | | IT | |03106001977 | | | | | | | | US | |023520014300165 | | | | | | | UK | ______________|_____________|____|____________|___________|__|__|__|____|____| CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= 00000 15000006 FTP FOR ECSVAX 00000 15000019 FTP FOR EEVAX 00000 15000034 WEST OF SCOT. COLL. OF AGRIC. 00000 15000036 FTP FOR CSTVAX 00000 1500100750 FTP FOR ITS63A 00000 1500101570 IT SCHOOL 63/40 00000 16000002 EMAS FRONT END ======================== = AUS - Australia = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= AUS 05052 28621000 ANGLO/AUSTRALIAN OBSERVATORY AUS 05052 28621001 CSIRO RADIO-PHYSICS AUS 05052 28621001 FTP FOR EPPING AUS 05052 82620000 FTP FOR AUSTEK AUS 05052 82620000 VAX IN SIDNEY, AUSTRALIA AUS 05053 210003 MIDAS FOX TEST ======================== = CH - Switzerland = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= CH 02284 64110115 DATA.STAR CH 02284 6811405 CH 02284 681140510,LO PACX2 CH 02284 6911003 NOS.CYBER,CIA0543,GUEST CH 02284 79110650 KOMETH.TELEPAC CH 02284 7911118 ZEV CH 02284 64110110 DATASTAR CH 02284 68113150 MANAGEMENT JOINT TRUST ======================== = D - West Germany = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= D 02624 4890049130 D 02624 5211040026 D 02624 5211040026 PRIMENET D 02624 5221040002 D 02624 5221040006 MEDICAL DOCS,COLOGNE D 02624 5221040104 GERMAN MED. INST., COLOGNE D 02624 5228040187 PI.BONN D 02624 5300021713 D 02624 5400030029 D 02624 5400030035 D 02624 5400030041 D 02624 5400030046 D 02624 5400030071 D 02624 5400030090 (cierr 1402) D 02624 5400030104 D 02624 5400030105 D 02624 5400030110 HOST D 02624 5400030113 (cierr 1402) D 02624 5400030138 D 02624 5400030150 D 02624 5400030158 D 02624 5400030175 D 02624 5400030187 E2000 HAMBURG VAX D 02624 5400030201 HASYLAB-VAX D 02624 5400030202 HERA MAGNET MEASUREMENT VAX 750 D 02624 5400030215 D 02624 5400030259 D 02624 5400030261 D 02624 5400030296 DFH2001I D 02624 5400030502 D 02624 5400030519 D 02624 5400030566 DFH2001I D 02624 5400030578 PRIMENET 20.0.4 DREHH D 02624 5400090184 D 02624 5400091110 DT.MAILBOX D 02624 5611040009 CENTRE FOR INFO AND DOC,GERMANY D 02624 5615140282 D 02624 5621040000 TELEBOX D 02624 5621040000 TELEBOX D 02624 5621040014 ACF/VTAM D 02624 5621040025 OEVA D 02624 5621040026 HOST D 02624 5621040027 BASF/FER.VAX 8600 D 02624 5621040508 VCON0.BASF.A6 D 02624 5621040516 CN01 D 02624 5621040532 D 02624 5621040580 DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25 D 02624 5621040581 DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25 D 02624 5621040582 D 02624 5724740001 GERMAN CENTRE FOR TECH. D 02624 5890040004 ACS.MUNICH D 02624 5890040081 NOS.SW.SYS.MUNICH D 02624 5890040185 D 02624 5890040207 DATABASE OTTOBRUNN D 02624 5890040207 D 02624 5890040220 HOST D 02624 5890040221 HOST D 02624 5890040225 QNTEC.MUNICH D 02624 5890040262 BDS.UNIX D 02624 5890040266 D 02624 5890040281 DATUS.PAD D 02624 5890040510 D 02624 5890040522 PLESSEY.SEMICOND.VAX D 02624 5890040542 D 02624 589009012 D 02624 5913111 ERLANGEN CYBER 173, NURNBURG ======================== = F - France = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= F 02080 34020258 F 02080 7802016901 F 02080 38020676 ILL DIVA F 02080 91040047 SACLAY, FRANCE F 02080 91190258 LURE SYNCHROTRON SOURCE ======================== = GB - Great Britian = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= GB 02342 12300120 D.I.SERV. GB 02342 12301186 GB 02342 1300011 GB 02342 1440012 GB 02342 15710104 GB 02342 19200118 AUTONET GB 02342 19200146 GB 02342 19200154 GB 02342 19200190 PERG.INFOLN. GB 02342 19200203 GB 02342 19200222 GB 02342 19200300 UNI.LONDON GB 02342 19200304 GB 02342 19200394 SIANET GB 02342 19200871 GB 02342 19201002 GB 02342 1920100515 HOSTESS GB 02342 1920100615 GB 02342 192010100513 GB 02342 1920101013 GB 02342 1920101030 GB 02342 19709111 GB 02342 206411411 UNI.ESSEX GB 02342 20641141 UNI.ESSEX GB 02342 22236236 GB 02342 2271511 ---,GUEST,FRIEND (CALL PIP) GB 02342 2790014302 ALCATEL GB 02342 12080105 GB 02342 12300120 DIALOG VIA DIALNET IN LONDON GB 02342 123002920 GB 02342 12301281 ONE TO ONE COMMS GB 02342 13900101 ALVEY MAIL FACILITY GB 02342 1390010150 ALVEY MAIL SYS FTP GB 02342 19200100 UNI OF LONDON COMPUTING CENTRE GB 02342 19200171 GB 02342 19200220 BRITISH LIBRARY ON-LINE SYSTEM GB 02342 19200300 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON GB 02342 19200394 COMPUTER SERVICES, LONDON GB 02342 1920100513 BRITISH TELECOM SERVICES GB 02342 1920100620 P. ON-LINE BILLING SERVICE GB 02342 1920102517 GB 02342 20641141 UNI OF ESSEX FTP GB 02342 2223616300 CARDIFF UNIVERSITY MULTICS GB 02342 27200110 GEAC 8000 ITI GB 02342 27200112 HEWLETT PACKARD LABS, BRISTOL GB 02342 31300101 PRIME OFFICE, EDINBURGH GB 02342 31300102 FORESTRY COMMISSION FTP GB 02342 31300105 LATTICE LOGIC LTD GB 02342 31300107 GB 02342 34417117 ICL BRACKNELL GB 02342 41200107 GB 02342 4620010243 ICL WEST GORTON 'B' SERVICE GB 02342 4620010248 ICL WEST GORTON 'X' SERVICE GB 02342 4620010277 FTP FOR ICL WEST GORTON PERQ GB 02342 4620010277 ICL WEST GORTON PERQ GB 02342 46240240 ICL KIDSGROVE GB 02342 53300124 LEICESTER GB 02342 5820010604 AGRENET CPSE GB 02342 60227227 UNI OF LEICESTER FTP GB 02342 61600133 IBM - SALE GB 02342 61600133 IBM SALE FTP GB 02342 61643365 ICLBRA GB 02342 6164336543 ICL WEST GORTON 'B' SERVICE GB 02342 6164336548 ICL WEST GORTON 'X' SERVICE GB 02342 6164336577 FTP FOR ICL WEST GORTON PERQ GB 02342 6164336577 ICL WEST GORTON PERQ GB 02342 64200136 PRIMENET GB 02342 70712217 HATFIELD POLYTECHNIC GB 02342 75312212 BRITISH OXYGEN GB 02342 75312212 THE WORLD REPORTER GB 02342 78228282 ICL LETCHWORTH GB 02342 78228288 ICL LETCHWORTH GB 02342 90468168 GB 02342 90840111 SCICON, SOUTH ENGLAND GB 02342 93765265 BRITISH LIBRARY LENDING DIVI. ======================== = I - Italy = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= I 02222 620021 EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, ROME ======================== = IRL - Ireland = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= IRL 02724 31540002 EUROKOM (UNIV COLLEGE DUBLIN) IRL 02724 3154000803 IRL 02724 3154000803 IRL.HEA.TCD.DEC20 (TOPS-20) IRL 02724 3159000630 ======================== = N - Norway = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= N 02422 11000001 DEC-10, OSLO UNI ======================== = NL - Netherlands = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= NL 02041 294002 DUPHAR WEESP,HOLLAND ======================== = S - Sweden = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= S 02402 00310228 UNI.LUND S 02405 015503 GOTTENBURG, SWEDEN S 02405 02032832 ODEN, SWEDEN ======================== = SF - Finland = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= SF 02442 02007 CANDE IN FINLAND SF 02442 03008 VAX 11/750 IN FINLAND ======================== = USA = USA = ======================== CTR NUA NAME,UID,PW,REMARK ========================================================================= USA 03020 58700900 DATAPAC USA 03020 60100010 UNI.ALBERTA USA 03106 0050 USA 03106,DELPHI TYMNET USA 03110 2020014275 USA 03110 20423 USA 03110 4150002000 D.I.SERV. USA 03110 60300020 COL.DARTMOUTH USA 03106 GATEWAYS USA 03106 000000 Unknown USA 03106 000023 USA 03106 000032 USA 03106 000034 USA 03106 000050 NLM MIS bsd unix USA 03106 000060 USA 03106 000065 USA 03106 000066 BCS ** to be investigated ** USA 03106 000071 USA 03106 000081 COMPUTONE ** to be investigated ** USA 03106 000093 USA 03106 000096 REMOTE COMPUTING USA 03106 000098 LOCKHEED DATAPLAN USA 03106 000101 SIO USA 03106 000113 1=LINK SYS 3=BANK OF USA,ABACIS,DIRECTOR) USA 03106 000155 USA 03106 000173 TYMNET/CODAN NET. Inter-link USA 03106 000179 LBL USA 03106 000188 USA 03106 000210 USA 03106 000227 USA 03106 000241 HOST A,4 BAIFS BANK OF AMERICA S,3 SFDCS1 USA 03106 000249 USA 03106 000280 HONEYWELL MPL USA 03106 000289 ROSS SYSTEM (32,26,2,3,12,20,21) 7,5,17,18,47,51,A - unknown VAX systems 14,15 - RSTS ROSS SYSTEMS 9,43,44,45,48 - MICRO VMS VAX USA 03106 000307 INFOMEDIA SERVICE CENTRE ONE USA 03106 000315 USA 03106 000327 USA 03106 000331 (VM/370 system) USA 03106 000377 MONSANTO AD RESEARCH PRODUCTION APPLICATION NETWORK USA 03106 000379 USA 03106 000401 TMCS PUBLIC NETWORK USA 03106 000411 TYMNET/BOSTON/TNS-PK1 interlink USA 03106 000423 CORPORATE COMPUTER SERVICES USA 03106 000424 (link to 4 VM/370 systems) USA 03106 000428 AAMNET USA 03106 000439 MIS 2 (cierr 1402) USA 03106 000463 SIGNETICS VM/370 USA 03106 000464 USA 03106 000496 USA 03106 000497 UBS COMPUTER SYSTEMS (host) USA 03106 000498 USA 03106 000515 ONTYME II USA 03106 000581 USA 03106 000585 C/C/M USA 03106 000619 SPNB VM/370 USA 03106 000632 TYMNET/TRWNET inter-link USA 03106 000633 PUBLIC TYMNET/TRWNET INTERLINK USA 03106 000636 LINK TO TRAC SYSTEMS (over one 120 terminal) USA 03106 000646 USA 03106 000664 USA 03106 000674 USA 03106 000685 MTS-A RESEARCH (HOST) 10 - TOPS-20, 12 - UNKNOWN 14 - UNKNOWN, 20 - MTS(C) TOPS-20 30 - MTS(F) TOPS-20, 32 - UNKNOWN USA 03106 000704 TYMNET-CUP(704)/DUBB-NTS(4) inter-link USA 03106 000715 TYMNET TEST system USA 03106 000729 (VM/370 system) USA 03106 000731 USA 03106 000742 LADC L66A USA 03106 000755 CORPORATE COMPUTER SERVICES USA 03106 000759 USA 03106 000760 DEC host Solar Cae/Cam USA 03106 000761 DOJ host USA 03106 000788 TYMNET-6754/McGRAWHILL inter-link USA 03106 000793 J&J HOST USA 03106 000798 USA 03106 000800 link to: CSG VAX, CYBER 815, SB1, SB2, SB3, SCN-NET USA 03106 000821 USA 03106 000832 ONTYME II USA 03106 000842 USA 03106 000850 CISL SERVICE MACHINE USA 03106 000859 USA 03106 000871 USA 03106 000898 P&W USA 03106 000932 USA 03106 001010 DITYMNET01 USA 03106 001024 USA 03106 001030 USA 03106 001036 IBM1 USA 03106 001042 IDC/370 USA 03106 001043 USA 03106 001053 STRATEGIC INFORMATION USA 03106 001056 SYNTEX TIMESHARING USA 03106 001105 HOST SGNY 1 - VAX II PRODUCTIONS SYSTEM 3 - VAX II PRODUCTIONS SYSTEM (tried to 5) USA 03106 001110 USA 03106 001134 COMPUSERVE USA 03106 001141 MESSAGE SERVICE SYSTEM (FOX) USA 03106 001143 USA 03106 001152 USA 03106 001158 TYMNET USER SERVICE USA 03106 001227 ACF2 USA 03106 001288 USA 03106 001304 ONTYME II USA 03106 001309 USA 03106 001316 USA 03106 001320 USA 03106 001328 USA 03106 001330 MULTICS, HVN 862-3642 USA 03106 001341 USA 03106 001358 USA 03106 001361 THOMPSON COMPONENTS-MOSTEK CORPORATION USA 03106 001383 HOST 1,A - TILLINGHAST BENEFITS T.SHAR.SYS. 2,C - TILLINGHAST INSURANCE T.SHAR.SYS. 4,D - OUTDIALS 6 - TILLINGHAST VAX 8600 (tried to 10,G) USA 03106 001391 SOCAL USA 03106 001399 C80 USA 03106 001400 TMCS PUBLIC NETWORK USA 03106 001410 DATALYNX/3274 TERMINAL USA 03106 001417 USA 03106 001434 (host system) - double digits VM is active, tried to BZ USA 03106 001438 USA 03106 001443 USA 03106 001467 STN INTERNATIONAL USA 03106 001482 FNOC DDS USA 03106 001483 ADR HEADQUARTERS USA 03106 001487 USA 03106 001488 (cierr 1402) USA 03106 001502 ARGON NATIONAL LAB USA 03106 001508 IDC/370 USA 03106 001509 USA 03106 001514 (HOST) DC-10 USA 03106 001519 USA 03106 001533 SBS DATA CENTRE USA 03106 001557 USA 03106 001560 USA 03106 001572 PRIMECON NETWORK (system 50) USA 03106 001578 USA 03106 001589 USA 03106 001594 CON138 USA 03106 001611 USA 03106 001612 TYMNET-NEWARK/TSN-MRI inter-link USA 03106 001616 TYMNET-5027/McGRAW HILL inter-link USA 03106 001624 USA 03106 001642 Host, A - CORNELLA (system choices displayed) USA 03106 001659 BYTE INFORMATIO EXCHANGE,GUEST,GUEST USA 03106 001663 PEOPLE LINK USA 03106 001665 USA 03106 001709 USA 03106 001715 TYMNET/BOFANET inter-link USA 03106 001727 USA 03106 001757 USA 03106 001763 USA 03106 001765 USA 03106 001766 PRIMENET USA 03106 001769 S.C. JOHNSON & SON R & D COMPUTER SYSTEMS USA 03106 001789 HOST WYLBUR.N - CICS TWX A,C,D,G,H,P,R,S,V,Z USA 03106 001799 (HOST) classes: 5 - VM/370, 20,23,26 UNKNOWN (TRIED TO 32) USA 03106 001807 USA 03106 001817 MITEL Host (no luck up to sys 20) USA 03106 001819 TMCS PUBLIC NETWORK USA 03106 001831 MULTICS USA 03106 001842 USA 03106 001844 USA 03106 001851 USA 03106 001853 USA 03106 001854 USA 03106 001857 USA 03106 001864 SUNGARDS CENTRAL COMPUTER FACILITY NETWORKS USA 03106 001873 MULTICS MR10.2I USA 03106 001874 USA 03106 001880 USA 03106 001881 USA 03106 001892 PRIMENET (certain hours) USA 03106 001897 USA 03106 001912 USA 03106 001977 USA 03106 002040 USA 03106 002041 USA 03106 002046 MITEL CORP IN KANATA USA 03106 002050 TYMNET/BOFANET inter-link,ABACIS,SFDCS1 1 - link, 2 - SFDCS1,DIRECTOR, 3 - ABACIS,ABACIS A - ABACIS 2 (note, Abacis may be used as U/N for many systems on tymnet) USA 03106 002060 USA 03106 002070 USA 03106 002086 USA 03106 002095 COMODEX ONLINE SYSTEM USA 03106 002098 D & B,COMMANDO,DIRECTOR,FUCK USA 03106 002099 D & B,COMMANDO,ASSASIN,SHIT USA 03106 002100 D & B,COMMANDO,DIRECTOR,FUCK,RAIDER USA 03106 002109 TYMNET/15B (inter-link) USA 03106 002164 MITRE SYSTEM USA 03106 002179 USA 03106 002188 USA 03106 002196 USA 03106 002200 USA 03106 002201 USA 03106 002212 USA 03106 002222 USA 03106 002286 Primenet TFGI USA 03106 002299 CONSILIUM USA 03106 002306 USA 03106 002314 USA 03106 002320 USA 03106 002329 MFE USA 03106 002330 USA 03106 002384 USA 03106 002387 ** TO BE INVESTIGATED ** USA 03106 002391 USA 03106 002408 USA 03106 002418 UNC VAX USA 03106 002443 DATAHUB USA 03106 002445 USA 03106 002446 USA 03106 002453 PRIMENET USA 03106 002470 USA 03106 002496 NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM USA 03106 002519 USA 03106 002537 USA 03106 002539 TYMNET/CIDN Inter-link USA 03106 002545 CENTRE FOR SEISMIC STUDIES USA 03106 002578 SEL USA 03106 002580 ** to be investigated ** USA 03106 002584 (HOST) USA 03106 002602 MULTICS USA 03106 002603 MULTICS system M USA 03106 002609 CON5 USA 03106 002614 HOST USA 03106 002623 VAX/VMS,GUEST USA 03106 002624 SUNEX-2060 TOPS-20 USA 03106 002632 USA 03106 002635 QUOTDIAL USA 03106 002646 USA 03106 002657 USA 03106 002667 USA 03106 002677 THE TIMES USA 03106 002694 PVM3101,SPDS/MTAM, MLCM,VM/SP,STRATUS-1,STRATUS-2 USA 03106 002700 ANALYTICS SYSTNE USA 03106 002709 AUTONET USA 03106 002713 USA 03106 002730 USA 03106 002732 USA 03106 002744 USA 03106 002765 MULTICS USA 03106 002768 (cierr 1402) USA 03106 002779 SCJ TIMESHARING USA 03106 002790 VM/370 USA 03106 002800 USA 03106 002807 ISC USA 03106 002824 USA 03106 002842 USA 03106 002843 USA 03106 002851 CHEM NETWORK DTSS USA 03106 002864 RCA SEMICUSTOM USA 03106 002871 (same as 5603) USA 03106 002875 (cierr 1402) MTECH/COMMERCIAL SERVICES DIVISION USA 03106 002889 ** to be investigated ** USA 03106 002901 USA 03106 002910 (CIERR 1402) USA 03106 002921 CHRYSLER NETWORK USA 03106 002971 USA 03106 002991 US MIS IS400 USA 03106 002995 VAIL VAX USA 03106 002998 TYMNET/FIRN DATE NETWORK Inter-link USA 03106 003002 MULTICS USA 03106 003009 USA 03106 003028 DCOM class - 0 USA 03106 003030 DCOM class - 0 *investigate* USA 03106 003036 USA 03106 003050 ATPCO FARE INFORMATION SYSTEM USA 03106 003062 (Host) class 0,1 ** to be investigated ** USA 03106 003079 VM/370 USA 03106 003092 TYMNET/PROTECTED ACCESS SERVICE SYS. Inter-link USA 03106 003168 VM/370 USA 03106 003214 VM/370 USA 03106 003220 VM/370 USA 03106 003221 VM/370 USA 03106 003248 USA 03106 003284 COMPUFLIGHT USA 03106 003286 VAX USA 03106 003295 TYMNET/PROTECTED ACCESS SERVICE SYSTEMS Inter-link,ABACIS USA 03106 003297 TYMNET/PROTECTED ACCESS SERVICE SYSTENS Inter-link,ABACIS USA 03106 003310 USA 03106 003321 USA 03106 003356 USA 03106 003365 USA 03106 003373 IOCSQ USA 03106 003394 (HOST WYN) 1 - VM/370, 2 - VM/370, 3 - IKJ53020A, 5 - VM/370 6 - NARDAC - NARDAC USA 03106 003420 USA 03106 003443 ** TO BE INVESTIGATED ** USA 03106 003520 USA 03106 003527 USA 03106 003529 (CIERR 1402) USA 03106 003534 USA 03106 003564 (CIERR 1402) USA 03106 003568 OAK TREE SYSTEMS LTD USA 03106 003572 NORTH AMERICA DATA CENTRE USA 03106 003579 USA 03106 003604 VM/370 USA 03106 003605 USA 03106 003623 USA 03106 003797 USA 03106 003828 TYMNET/AKNET Inter-link USA 03106 003831 USA 03106 003846 (same as 5603) USA 03106 003879 (CIERR 1402) USA 03106 003882 BEKINS COMPANY MUS/XA ACF/VTAM NETWORK USA 03106 003946 USA 03106 003973 FORD -ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC DIRECTORY USA 03106 003994 FORD -ELECTRICAL ELECTRONIC DIRECTORY USA 03106 004007 USA 03106 004016 USA 03106 004028 MDS-870 USA 03106 004041 RCA GLOBCOM'S PACKET SWITCHING SERICE USA 03106 004092 USA 03106 004125 USA 03106 004129 ---,ABACIS USA 03106 004131 ---,ABACIS USA 03106 004137 TSO, VM/370 USA 03106 004173 USA 03106 004174 VM/370 USA 03106 004202 USA 03106 004206 MAINSTREAMS USA 03106 004210 USA 03106 004288 USA 03106 004296 USA 03106 004341 (HOST) 2 - VM/370, T - VM/370, 1,3,4,A,C,E,Z USA 03106 004350 AEC ** TO BE INVESTIGATED ** USA 03106 004365 NATIONAL LIB.OF MEDICINE'S TOXIC.DATA NETWORK USA 03106 004389 BUG BUSTING MACHINE OF NYN USA 03106 004468 BETINS COQ,6R5u(VACF/VTAM NETWORK USA 03106 004472 ROLM CBX DATA-SWITCHING USA 03106 004499 MRCA USA 03106 004514 US MISS (IS400) USA 03106 004530 (Host) active centre AA, ** investigate ! ** USA 03106 004541 (Host) USA 03106 004545 HMN USA 03106 004555 2 CASTER BACKUP USA 03106 004562 USA 03106 004573 USA 03106 004579 USA 03106 004580 TSO USA 03106 004619 USA 03106 004645 USA 03106 004702 PRIMENET USA 03106 004706 (Host) USA 03106 004726 NALCOCS DEC-10 USA 03106 004743 TYMNET INFO SERVICE USA 03106 004755 STORE DEVELOPMENT MACHINE USA 03106 004759 (Host) USA 03106 004791 MIS GROUP/CAD DIVISION/COMPUTERLAND CORP. USA 03106 004828 VTAM007 USA 03106 004865 GAB BUSINESS SERVICES USA 03106 004869 USA 03106 004898 USA 03106 004946 USA 03106 004949 USA 03106 004956 (Host) 0 - Vax, 1 - KL1, 2 - KL, 3 - IBM, 8 - VAX 2, 11 - PC1-130 USA 03106 004957 NEC SEMI-CUSTOM DESIGN CENTRE USA 03106 005018 (Host) USA 03106 005034 (cierr 1402) USA 03106 005058 USA 03106 005062 UIS SUPPB=MQDIRNET USA 03106 005080 USA 03106 005082 COMPAQ USA 03106 005107 USA 03106 005119 (Host) USA 03106 005124 OPERATIONAL INFO SYSTEM VAX USA 03106 005136 ** to be investogated ** USA 03106 005224 (Host) USA 03106 005229 UNIV.OF PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCE USA 03106 005267 CHANEL 01 USA 03106 005320 (Host) US DIGMAL COMPUTER SERVICES USA 03106 005433 USA 03106 005438 USA 03106 005453 USA 03106 005463 VM/370 USA 03106 005528 STRATUS/32 USA 03106 005531 STRATUS/32 USA 03106 005539 VA II/730 USA 03106 005564 STRATUS/32 USA 03106 005566 Host sys A,1 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system ALICE B,2 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system BAMBI 3 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system CHIP 4 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system DALE 5 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system ELLIOT 6 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system FLOWER 12,7 - 3M TRAC SERVICE system GRUMPY 8 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM HAPPY 9 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM ISABEL 10 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM JUMBO 11 - TRAC CLUSTER VIRGO, SYSTEM KANGA 13 - VAX 18 - DIGITAL ETHERNET 28 - unknown 31 - CIERR 1402 32 - CIERR 1402 33 - CIERR 1402 34 - CIERR 1402 35 - CIERR 1402 36 - unknown 37 - CIERR 1402 38 - unknown 40 - CPU-STP-A 41 - CIERR 1402 43 - UNKNOWN 44 - ATLAS VAX 45 - FAXON INFO SERVICE 46 - ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS LABORATORY VASX II/750 47,48,49 - unknown 52 - SERC COMPUTER RESOURCES VAX 53 - unknown 54 - SERC COMPUTER RESOURCES VAX 55 - BDS UNIX 81,61 - TRAC CLUSTER LIBRA system LADY 62 - TRAC CLUSTER LIBRA system MICKEY 63 - TRAC CLUSTER GEMINI system NEMO 64 - TRAC CLUSTER GEMINI system OWL 65 - TRAC CLUSTER LIBRA system PLUTO 67 - TRAC CLUSTER GEMINI system QUASAR 68 - unknown 70 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX 71 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX 72 - TRACE TIMESHARING VAX 73 - DIGITAL ETHERNET TERMINAL SERVER 74 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX 76 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX 81 - TRAC TIMESHARING VAX USA 03106 005569 STRATUS/32 USA 03106 005571 STRATUS/32 USA 03106 005603 (Host) systems 1,2,3,4,5,C (5=Outdial) USA 03106 005622 USA 03106 005683 TECHNICAL SUPPORT PRODUCTIONS USA 03106 005697 USA 03106 005702 AUTH USA 03106 005704 SPOOL USA 03106 005705 USA 03106 005706 USA 03106 005707 USA 03106 005708 IFPSE USA 03106 005709 IFPSE USA 03106 005711 IFXMP USA 03106 005712 USA 03106 005725 PRIMENET USA 03106 005744 (Cierr 1402) USA 03106 005755 Host system, active links = A,B,C,E,F,H,G,I, J,K,L,M,O,P,Q,R, S,T,U,V,W,X,Y,Z USA 03106 005758 SEI/MUS SYSTEM USA 03106 005805 USA 03106 005818 CORPORATE MANAGEMENT INFO SYSTEMS USA 03106 005846 (Host) USA 03106 005897 USA 03106 005903 USA 03106 005941 USA 03106 005969 PLESSEY SEMICONDUCTORS-IRVINE USA 03106 005984 CREDIT AGRICOLE-USA USA 03106 006019 PRIMENET USA 03106 006046 USA 03106 006093 NALCO CHEMICAL COMPANY NETWORK USA 03106 006121 CORPORATE MANAGEMENT INFO SERVICE USA 03106 006187 USA 03106 006190 CLEVELAND USA 03106 006191 USA 03106 006227 USA 03106 006251 USA 03106 006281 EDCS USA 03106 006283 EDCS USA 03106 006296 USA 03106 006432 EASYLINK USA 03106 006434 EASYLINK USA 03106 006440 USA 03106 006590 US CENTRA SERVICE USA 03106 006597 USA 03106 006686 USA 03106 006722 INTERNATIONAL NETWORK USA 03106 006828 USA 03106 006832 A&A DATANET (SYSTEMS 1,8,0,14) USA 03106 006833 (GO AWAY) USA 03106 006834 USA 03106 006835 TOC USA 03106 006867 DATABILITY TIMESHARING SYSTEM II USA 03106 006994 USA 03106 007028 USA 03106 007103 USA 03106 007177 USA 03106 007272 (CIERR 1402) USA 03106 007351 PRIMENET USA 03106 007352 PRIMENET USA 03106 007377 USA 03106 007596 (Host) A - VM/370, B - VM/370 USA 03106 007640 - J. Sluggo _______________________________________________________________________________ ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 5 of 11 /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\ \/ \/ /\ Satellite Communications /\ \/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ \/ /\ By Scott Holiday /\ \/ July 11, 1988 \/ /\ /\ \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/ Satellite communications systems employ microwave terminals on satellites and ground to earth stations for highly reliable and high-capacity communications circuits. The communication satellites are positioned in geosynchronous orbits about 22,000 miles above the earth. Thus the rotation of the satellite matches that of the earth, and the satellite appears motionless above earth stations. Three equally spaces satellites are required to cover the entire world. The satellite's microwave terminals receive signals from an earth station and retransmit those signals on another frequency to another earth station. Because of the long distances involved, the round-trip communications path takes about a half second. This is referred to as the propagation delay. The propagation delay on a regular terrestrial phone line is about 1 millisecond (ms) per 100 miles. Each microwave terminal on the satellite, designated as a repeater or transponder, includes a receiver for uplink transmissions and a transmitter for down-link transmissions. Separate bands of frequencies for up-link and down-link transmissions are designated in the 1.5-30 GHz frequency range (1.5 GHz is equal to 1,500,000,000 Hz, or 1.5 billion hertz). Typical frequencies for communications satellites are 4-6 GHz for INTELSAT 5 and 12-14 GHz for Anik-B, a Canadian satellite. Each satellite transponder typically has twelve 36-MHz channels which can be used for voice, data, or television signals. Early communications satellites had some 12 to 20 transponders, and the later satellites have up to 27 or more transponders. INTELSAT 5, for example, has a total of 27 or more transponders providing 24,500 data/voice channels, one transponder providing two 17.5-MHz TV channels, and one SPADE transponder with 800 channels. SPADE (Single carrier per channel, Pulse code modulation, multiple Access, Demand assignment) is a digital telephone service which reserves a pool of channels in the satellite for use on a demand-assignment basis. SPADE circuits can be activated on a demand basis between different countries and used for long or short periods of time as needed. Propagation Delay: The approximate quarter second one-way propagation delay in satellite communications affects both voice telephone and data communications. Users of voice communications via satellite links face two objectionable characteristics; delayed speech and return echoes. Echo suppressors are installed to reduce the return echoes to an acceptable level. Data communications operations face more serious problems caused by propagation delay. Line protocol and error detection/correction schemes are slowed down dramatically by the quarter second of delay. User response time requirements can be difficult to meet because of these cumulative effects. Satellite delay compensation units are available to ensure a connection and afford better operation for the terrestrial communications terminal that were never designed to deal with the propagation delay of communications satellites. One delay compensation unit is required at each final destination. The units reformat the data into larger effective transmission blocks so that retransmision requests are sent back less frequently. This reduces the number of line turnarounds, each of which requires about a quarter second to go from or return to the destination terminal or computer. One error detection and correction method used, called GO-BACK-N, requires that all blocks of data held in the transmitting buffer, back to the one with the error in it, must be retransmitted. A more efficient method is to retransmit only the block of data with the error, but this requires more logic in the equipment at each end. Link to Earth Stations: Most users cannot afford a satellite earth station, so a land line is needed for a connection to the nearest earth station (Which they tell me is 65,000 bps for a leased line). Because of the great distance the signal must travel in space, the relatively short distance between the two users on earth becomes insignificant and actually does not affect the operating cost. It is generally not economical. This is particularly true of high-capacity or broadband applications. Even though operating costs are insensitive to distance, satellite companies may still charge more for longer distances based on terrestrial line competition. Nonterrestrial Problems: The nonterrestrial portion of satellite communications bypasses the problems encountered with broken phone lines, etc., but it has its own unique set of problems. Since satellite communications employ high-frequency microwave radio transmission, careful planning is required to avoid interference between the satellite and other microwave systems. Eclipses of the sun, and even the moon, can cause trouble because they cut off the source of energy for the satellite's solar batteries. Backup batteries are used to resolve most of these difficulties, but the problem that is the most severe is when the sun gets directly behind the satellite and becomes a source of unacceptable noise. This occurs 10 times a year for about 10 min each time. In order to obtain uninterrupted service, an earth station must have a second dish antenna a short distance away or the single dish antenna must have access to another satellite. Accessing the Satellite: There are three methods by which multiple users (earth stations) can access the satellite. The first is frequency-division multiple access (FDMA), whereby the total bandwidth is divided into separate frequency channels assigned to the users. Each user has a channel, which could remain idle if that user had no traffic. Time-division multiple access (TDMA) provides each user with a particular time slot or multiple time slots. Here the channels are shared, but some time slots could be idle if a user has no traffic to offer. With code-division multiple access (CDMA) each user can utilize the full bandwidth at any time by employing a unique code to identify the user's traffic. There are, of course, trade-offs among the three methods; they involve error rate, block size, throughput, interference, and cost. Advantages: o Satellite lines are exceptionally well suited for broadband applications such as voice, television, and picture-phone, and the quality of transmission is high. o Satellite lines are generally less expensive for all voice and data types of transmission, whether it be dial-up or a leased line that is not short. This is particularly true of overseas transmissions, and there is no underwater cable to create maintenance problems. Disadvantages: o The propagation delay of about a quarter second way requires the participants of a voice conversation so slightly delay their responses to make sure no more conversation is still on the way. The propagation delay has more of a severe effect on the transmission of data, and the effect becomes more pronounced with high speeds, half duplex operation, smaller blocks of data, and polling. Satellite delay units, front end processors, multiplexers, and other devices have been designed to get around these problems, but there is no solution to the half second lost in total response time for interactive applications. o Some of the modems currently in use today have not been designed to handle the long delay of the initial connection via satellite, and the result can be a lost connection. This can be frustrating when the common carrier elects to use satellite lines for regular dial-up calls up to say, 55 percent of all calls out of a particular city during the busy traffic periods. Closing: Satellite communications is a very interesting topic to study. Perhaps even the present/and future satellite and Ham radio "Hackers" will one day be running a Bulletin Board off of a WESTSTAR satellite -- Who's to say there isn't one now? (Devious Snicker) --Scott Holiday ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 6 of 11 <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> <> <> <> Organizations Supporting The Telecommunications Network Operations <> <> <> <> NETWORK MANAGEMENT CENTER <> <> _____________________________________________________ <> <> | | <> <> | A description of the Network Management Center/NMC | <> <> | and its role in providing the best possible service | <> <> | to the customers of the telecommunications network. | <> <> |_____________________________________________________| <> <> <> <> Brought to you by <> <> Knight Lightning & Taran King <> <> <> <> August 9, 1988 <> <> <> <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Introduction To Network Management - Southwestern Bell Telephone Company ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Modern Telecommunications Networks, relying on direct customer input and common and stored program controlled switching, are generally very reliable and have provided the means to supply low cost telecommunication service to all who desire it. Because these networks are designed on the probability that all customers do not require service simultaneously, they are engineered and equipped to provide acceptable levels of service during normal traffic load periods. When customer demands or equipment malfunctions cause a deviation from the engineered requirements or heavier than normal calling occurs, modern networks can become congested and network throughput can be affected. Network Management provides a means to improve the performance of the network during these contingencies. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Purpose And Objectives ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Network Management Centers purpose is to provide the constant surveillance and control activities necessary to maintain the network at its optimum level of performance. This includes the Bell Operating Company (BOC) Intra-Lata Networks and Inter-Exchange Facilities and Circuits. NMC's objective is to meet customer and market needs and expectations, and at the same time, maximize revenues derived from the provision of network service. While the NMC cannot guarantee a certain level of service to the customer, it can ensure the most effective use of existing network capacity in all situations. This will result in: - More completed calls - Higher return on network capital investment - Better customer service - Protection of essential services such as 911, during abnormal network situations - Ensuring equal access - Assisting in national security and emergency preparedness The NMC has the capability to alter or change the switching network on a near real-time basis. This is accomplished thru Network Control Actions in the switching machines. Control messages from the NMC are acted upon by the switching machines to either expand capacity by utilizing idle equipment and trunks or to restrict the network by denying access to traffic that has a poor chance of completion, thereby freeing equipment and trunks for traffic that has a good chance of completion. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Principles And Responsibilities Of Operations ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In accomplishing the purpose and objective of the NMC, decision on network control actions are guided by standard principle applicable to switching technology or network architecture. All network management control actions are generally based upon at least one of the standard principles. Inhibit Switching Congestion ---------------------------- Large numbers of ineffective attempts in a switching machine due to traffic overload or equipment malfunctions can exceed the engineered capacity of the system. If not controlled, this congestion can spread to other connected switching systems. Network management controls are available that remove ineffective attempts to a congested machine, inhibiting switching congestion and preventing its spread to adjacent switching systems. Use All Available Trunks ------------------------ The switching network is sized and equipped to accommodate the average business day calling requirements. Focused overloads (storms, holidays, floods, and civil disturbances) can often result in greatly increased calling patterns for which the network is not designed. This aberration can also be caused by facility failures and switching system outages. In these cases some trunk groups are greatly overloaded while others may be virtually idle. Network management reroutes can be activated in many of these cases to use temporary idle capacity in the network, thereby completing calls that would otherwise be blocked. Keep All Trunks Filled With Messages ------------------------------------ A message is a completed call. Since the network is normally trunk limited, it is important to optimize the ratio of messages (revenue) to non-messages (non revenue producing) on any trunk group. When unusual or abnormal conditions occur in the network that cause increased short holding time calls (non-message such as busy tone, reorder tone, recorded announcement, and high-and-dry - dead air), the number of carried messages decreases because non-message traffic is occupying a larger percentage of system capacity. Network management controls are designed to reduce non-message traffic and allow more calls to complete. This results in higher customer satisfaction and increased revenue for the industry. Give Priority To Single-Link Connections ---------------------------------------- In networks designed to automatically alternate route calls, the most efficient use of available trunking occurs when traffic loads are at (or below) normal engineered values. When the engineered traffic load is exceeded, more calls alternate route and therefore are required to use more than one trunk in order to complete a call. During overload situations, the use of more than one trunk to complete a call occurs more often and the possibility of a multilink call blocking other call attempts is greatly increased. Thus, in some cases, it becomes necessary to use network management controls to limit alternate routing in order to give first routed traffic a reasonable chance to complete more calls on the network than would otherwise be completed. The responsibility of the Network Management Center is far-reaching, affecting many work groups and organizations both in Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, other telephone companies, and the customers. The NMC provides: - Real-time surveillance and control of the switching network - Identifying abnormal network situations - A centralized point for information to higher management, IC's, Independent Companies, and other BOC's. - A focal point for national security and emergency preparedness concerns - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The System -- A Picture ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Network Management System consists of three major components: The switching network itself, the data gathering support system, and the surveillance and control system (NMC). The NMC is driven by customer actions in the switching network which are recorded and displayed via the EADAS/NM (Engineering Administration Data Acquisition System for Network Management). Network management control actions are directed from the CRT to the switching network via the same system. Diagram; Switching Data Gathering NMC Surveillance Network System and Control ____________ __________________ ______________________ / \ / \ / \ ____________ ___ _______________ | |_______________________| | | | | Access | | E | /| Display Board | | Tandem | ___ | A | / |_______________| | | | |__________| D | / | End Office |________| E | Data | A |/ | | | A |__________| S |\ | Equal | | D | Network | / | \ | Access | | A | Controls | N | \ | End Office | | S |__________| M | \ |____________| |___| | | \ __________________ | | | \ | | _|_ | | \| Cathode Ray Tube | / \ | | |__________________| \___/ |___| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Introducing: The Southwestern Bell Telephone Company Network Management Centers ___________________ | | ___| Southwestern Bell |__________________________________________ | | Corporations | | | | | |___________________| ______|_______ ______|_______ ______|_______ | | || || | | | SW Bell || SW Bell || SW Bell | | |Mobile Systems|| Telecom || Publications | | |______________||______________||______________| __|________________ | | | Southwestern Bell | | Telephone | |___________________| | |----> Little Rock NMC Arkansas (Non EADAS/NM) (501)373-5126 |----> St. Louis NMC Missouri & Kansas (314)658-6044 |----> Oklahoma City NMC Oklahoma (405)278-5511 * |----> Dallas NMC North Texas (214)464-2164 |----> Houston NMC South Texas (713)850-5662 * * - After hours, this number goes to a beeper, at the tone, dial in your telephone number. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Summary ~~~~~~~ Network Management is the term used to describe a variety of activities associated with improving network traffic flow and customer service when abnormal conditions (unusual traffic patterns or equipment failures) may have resulted in a congested inefficient network. These activities include the application of network controls when and where necessary and planning the means by which the impact of network overloads can be minimized. Network Management is based upon the use of near real-time trunk group and switching system data and the ability to implement appropriate network controls thru the use of EADAS/NM. Network Management is concerned with completing as many calls as possible within the Intra-Lata network and providing equal treatment for the traffic flow to and from all inter-exchange carriers. "The Future Is Forever" _______________________________________________________________________________ ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 7 of 11 ()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()() () () () Non-Published Numbers () () ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ () () An Observation Of Illinois Bell () () () () by Patrick Townson () () of The Portal System (TM) () () () () Special Thanks to Hatchet Molly () () () ()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()() All examples in this message pertain to Illinois Bell Telephone Company, which covers the Chicago metropolitan area, and quite a bit of the rest of Illinois. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - There are three types of phone numbers which do not appear in the printed and publicly available directory; (1) Too new to list (2) Non-listed (3) Non-published The third category of numbers not in the phone book or available from the Directory Assistance Bureau are non-published numbers. Non-published numbers are NOT available at the directory Assistance level. Inquiries about same which are input into a DA (Directory Assistance) terminal simply come up with a message that "at the customer's request, the number is not listed in our records; the number is non-published." Well, who does keep non-pub records then? The Business Office has no handy way to retrieve them, since they depend on an actual phone number when they pull up a record to discuss an account. Once a service order is processed, the number and associated name are no longer available to the average worker in the central office. There was for several years a small group known as the "NonPub Number Bureau" which at the time was located in Hinsdale, Illinois. Needless to say, the phone number to the NonPub Number Bureau was itself non-published, and was only available to specified employees at Illinois Bell who were deemed to have a "need to know clearance." Now with all the records being highly computerized, the keepers of the Non-Pub phone numbers are themselves scattered around from one phone office to another. When there is some specific need for an employee at the phone company to acquire the non-published number of a subscriber, then certain security precautions kick into place. Only a tiny percentage of telephone company employees are deemed to have a "need to know clearance" in the first place; among these would be the GCO's (Group Chief Operators), certain management people in the central offices, certain people in the Treasury/Accounting office, and of course, security representatives both from Illinois Bell and the various long distance carriers, such as AT&T, US. Sprint, and MCI. Let us have a hypothetical example for our correspondent; Your mother has taken seriously ill, and is on her deathbed. Your brother is unable to reach you to notify you of this because you have a non-pub number. When his request for the number has been turned down by Directory Assistance, simply because they do not have it, he asks to speak with a supervisor, and he explains the problem. He provides his own name and telephone number, and the supervisor states he will be called back at a later time. The supervisor does not question if in fact an emergency exists, which is the only valid reason for breaking security. The supervisor may, if they are doing their job correctly, ask the inquirer point blank, "Are you stating there is an emergency situation?" Please bear in mind that the law in Illinois and in many other states says that if a person claims that an emergency exists in order to influence the use (or discontinuance of use) of the telephone when in fact there is no emergency is guilty of a misdemeanor crime. You say yes this is an emergency and I need to contact my brother/sister/etc right away. The supervisor will then talk to his/her supervisor, who is generally of the rank of Chief Operator for that particular facility. The Chief Operator will call the NonPub people, will identify herself, and *leave her own call back number*. The NonPub people will call back to verify the origin of the call, and only then will there be information given out regards your brother's telephone number. It helps if you know the *exact* way the name appears in the records, and the *exact* address; if there is more than one of that name with non-pub service, they may tell you they are unable to figure out who it is you want. The NonPub person will then call the subscriber with the non-published number and explain to them what has occurred, "So and so has contacted one of our operators and asked for assistance in reaching you. The party states that it is a family emergency which requires your immediate attention. Would it be alright if we give him/her your number, or would you prefer to call them back yourself?" Based on the answer given, the number is either relayed back to the Chief Operator, or a message is relayed back saying the non-pub customer has been notified. If the customer says it is okay to pass his number, then the Chief Operator will call you back, ask who YOU are, rather than saying WHO she wants, and satisfied with your identification will give you the number you are seeking or will advise you that your brother has been given the message by someone from our office, and has said he will contact you. Before the NonPub people will even talk to you, your 'call back number' has to be on their list of approved numbers for that purpose. A clerk in the Business office cannot imitate a Chief Operator for example, simply because NonPub would say that the number you are asking us to call back to is not on our list. "Tell your supervisor what it is you are seeking and have them call us..." Other emergency type requests for non-pub numbers would be a big fire at some business place in the middle of the night, and the owners of the company must be notified at their home; or a child is found wandering by the police and the child is too young to know his parent's (non-pub) number. They will also handle non-emergency requests, but only if they are of some importance and not frivolous in nature. You have just come to our city to visit and are seeking a long lost friend who has a non-pub number; you are compiling the invitations to your high school class fiftieth re-union and find a class member is non-pub. Within certain reasonable limits, they will pass along your request to the desired party and let them make the choice of whether to return the call or not. But always, you leave your phone number with them, and in due time someone will call you back to report what has been said or done. You would be surprised -- or maybe you wouldn't -- at the numerous scams and stories people tell the phone company to get the non-pub numbers of someone else. Fortunately, Bell takes a great deal of pride in their efforts to protect the privacy of their subscribers. -PT _______________________________________________________________________________ ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 8 of 11 \`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\ \`\ \`\ \`\ BLOCKING OF LONG-DISTANCE CALLS \`\ \`\ by Jim Schmickley \`\ \`\ \`\ \`\ Hawkeye PC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa \`\ \`\ \`\ \`\ Special Thanks To Hatchet Molly \`\ \`\ \`\ \`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\`\ SUMMARY -- This file describes the "blocking" by one long-distance telephone company of access through their system to certain telephone numbers, particularly BBS numbers. The blocking is applied in a very arbitrary manner, and the company arrogantly asserts that BBS SYSOPS and anyone who uses a computer modem are "hackers." The company doesn't really want to discuss the situation, but it appears the following scenario occurred. The proverbial "person or persons unknown" identified one or more "valid" long-distance account numbers, and subsequently used those numbers on one or more occasions to fraudulently call a legitimate computer bulletin board system (BBS). When the long-distance company discovered the fraudulent charges, they "blocked" the line without bothering to investigate or contacting the BBS System Operator to obtain his assistance. In fact, the company did not even determine the sysop's name. The long-distance carrier would like to pretend that the incident which triggered the actions described in this article was an isolated situation, not related to anything else in the world. However, there are major principles of free, uninhibited communications and individual rights deeply interwoven into the issue. And, there is still the lingering question, "If one long-distance company is interfering with their customers' communications on little more than a whim, are other long-distant companies also interfering with the American public's right of free 'electronic speech'?" CALL TO ACTION -- Your inputs and protests are needed now to counter the long-distance company's claims that "no one was hurt by their blocking actions because nobody complained." Obviously nobody complained for a long time because the line blocking was carried out in such a manner that no one realized, until April 1988, what was being done. Please read through the rest of this article and judge for yourself. Then, please write to the organizations listed at the end of the article; insist that your right to telephone whatever number you choose should not be impaired by the arbitrary decision of some telephone company bureaucrat who really doesn't care about the rights of his customers. Protest in the strongest terms. And, remember, the rights you save WILL BE YOUR OWN! SETTING THE SCENE -- Teleconnect is a long-distance carrier and telephone direct marketing company headquartered in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The company is about eight years old, and has a long-distance business base of approximately 200,000 customers. Teleconnect has just completed its first public stock offering, and is presently (August 1988) involved in a merger which will make it the nation's fourth-largest long-distance carrier. It is a very rapidly growing company, having achieved its spectacular growth by offering long distance service at rates advertised as being 15% to 30% below AT&T's rates. When Teleconnect started out in the telephone interconnection business, few, if any, exchanges were set up for "equal access," so the company set up a network of local access numbers (essentially just unlisted local PABXs - Private Automatic Branch eXchanges) and assigned a six-digit account number to each customer. Later, a seventh "security" digit was added to all account numbers. Teleconnect now offers direct "equal access" dialing on most exchanges, but the older access number/account code system is still in place for those exchanges which do not offer "equal access." That system is still very useful for customers who place calls from their offices or other locations away from home. "BLOCKING" DISCOVERED -- In early April 1988, a friend mentioned that Teleconnect was "blocking" certain telephone lines where they detected computer tone. In particular, he had been unable to call Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange BBS in Waterloo, Iowa. This sounded like something I should certainly look into, so I tried to call Curt's BBS. CONTACT WITH TELECONNECT -- Teleconnect would not allow my call to go through. Instead, I got a recorded voice message stating that the call was a local call from my location. A second attempt got the same recorded message. At least, they were consistent. I called my Teleconnect service representative and asked just what the problem was. After I explained what happened, she suggested that it must be a local call. I explained that I really didn't think a 70 mile call from Cedar Rapids to Waterloo was a local call. She checked on the situation and informed me that the line was being "blocked." I asked why, and she "supposed it was at the customer's request." After being advised that statement made no sense, she admitted she really didn't know why. So, on to her supervisor. The first level supervisor verified the line was being "blocked by Teleconnect security," but she couldn't or wouldn't say why. Then, she challenged, "Why do you want to call that number?" That was the wrong question to ask this unhappy customer, and the lady quickly discovered that bit of information was none of her business. On to her supervisor... The second level supervisor refused to reveal any information of value to a mere customer, but she did suggest that any line Teleconnect was blocking could still be reached through AT&T or Northwestern Bell by dialing 10288-1. When questioned why Teleconnect, which for years had sold its long-distance service on the basis of a cost-saving over AT&T rates, was now suggesting that customers use AT&T, the lady had no answer. I was then informed that, if I needed more information, I should contact Dan Rogers, Teleconnect's Vice President for Customer Service. That sounded good; "Please connect me." Then, "I'm sorry, but Mr. Rogers is out of town, and won't be back until next week." "Next week?" "But he does call in regularly. Maybe he could call you back before that." Mr. Rogers did call me back, later that day, from Washington, D.C. where he and some Teleconnect "security people" were attending a conference on telephone security. TELECONNECT RESPONDS, A LITTLE -- Dan Rogers prefaced his conversation with, "I'm just the mouthpiece; I don't understand all the technical details. Our security people are blocking that number because we've had some problems with it in the past." I protested that the allegation of "problems" didn't make sense because the number was for a computer bulletin board system operated by a reputable businessman, Curt Kyhl. Mr. Rogers said that I had just given Teleconnect new information; they had not been able to determine whose number they were blocking. "Our people are good, but they're not that good. Northwestern Bell won't release subscriber information to us." And, when he got back to his office the following Monday, he would have the security people check to see if the block could be removed. The following Monday, another woman from Teleconnect called to inform me that they had checked the line, and they were removing the block from it. She added the comment that this was the first time in four years that anyone had requested that a line be unblocked. I suggested that it probably wouldn't be the last time. In a later telephone conversation, Dan Rogers verified that the block had been removed from Curt Kyhl's line, but warned that the line would be blocked again "if there were any more problems with it." A brief, non-conclusive discussion of Teleconnect's right to take such action then ensued. I added that the fact that Teleconnect "security" had been unable to determine the identity of the SYSOP of the blocked board just didn't make sense; that it didn't sound as if the "security people" were very competent. Mr. Rogers then admitted that every time the security people tried to call the number, they got a busy signal (and, although Mr. Rogers didn't admit it, they just "gave up," and arbitrarily blocked the line). Oh, yes, the lying voice message, "This is a local call...," was not intended to deceive anyone according to Dan Rogers. It was just that Teleconnect could only put so many messages on their equipment, and that was the one they selected for blocked lines. BEGINNING THE PAPER TRAIL -- Obviously, Teleconnect was not going to pay much attention to telephone calls from mere customers. On April 22, Ben Blackstock, practicing attorney and veteran sysop, wrote to Mr. Rogers urging that Teleconnect permit their customers to call whatever numbers they desired. Ben questioned Teleconnect's authority to block calls, and suggested that such action had serious overlays of "big brother." He also noted that "you cannot punish the innocent to get at someone who is apparently causing Teleconnect difficulty." Casey D. Mahon, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Teleconnect, replied to Ben Blackstock's letter on April 28th. This response was the start of Teleconnect's seemingly endless stream of vague, general allegations regarding "hackers" and "computer billboards." Teleconnect insisted they did have authority to block access to telephone lines, and cited 18 USC 2511(2)(a)(i) as an example of the authority. The Teleconnect position was summed up in the letter: "Finally, please be advised the company is willing to 'unblock' the line in order to ascertain whether or not illegal hacking has ceased. In the event, however, that theft of Teleconnect long distance services through use of the bulletin board resumes, we will certainly block access through the Teleconnect network again and use our authority under federal law to ascertain the identity of the hacker or hackers." THE GAUNTLET IS PICKED UP -- Mr. Blackstock checked the cited section of the U.S. Code, and discovered that it related only to "interception" of communications, but had nothing to do with "blocking." He advised me of his opinion and also wrote back to Casey Mahon challenging her interpretation of that section of federal law. In his letter, Ben noted that, "Either Teleconnect is providing a communication service that is not discriminatory, or it is not." He added that he would "become upset, to say the least" if he discovered that Teleconnect was blocking access to his BBS. Mr. Blackstock concluded by offering to cooperate with Teleconnect in seeking a declaratory judgment regarding their "right" to block a telephone number based upon the actions of some third party. To date, Teleconnect has not responded to that offer. On May 13th, I sent my own reply to Casey Mahon, and answered the issues of her letter point by point. I noted that even I, not an attorney, knew the difference between "interception" and "blocking", and if Teleconnect didn't, they could check with any football fan. My letter concluded: "Since Teleconnect's 'blocking' policies are ill-conceived, thoughtlessly arbitrary, anti-consumer, and of questionable legality, they need to be corrected immediately. Please advise me how Teleconnect is revising these policies to ensure that I and all other legitimate subscribers will have uninhibited access to any and all long-distance numbers we choose to call." Casey Mahon replied on June 3rd. Not unexpectedly, she brushed aside all my arguments. She also presented the first of the sweeping generalizations, with total avoidance of specifics, which we have since come to recognize as a Teleconnect trademark. One paragraph neatly sums Casey Mahon's letter: "While I appreciate the time and thought that obviously went into your letter, I do not agree with your conclusion that Teleconnect's efforts to prevent theft of its services are in any way inappropriate. The inter-exchange industry has been plagued, throughout its history, by individuals who devote substantial ingenuity to the theft of long distance services. It is not unheard of for an interexchange company to lose as much as $500,000 a month to theft. As you can imagine, such losses, over a period of time, could drive a company out of business." ESCALATION -- By this time it was very obvious that Teleconnect was going to remain recalcitrant until some third party, preferably a regulatory agency, convinced them of the error of their ways. Accordingly, I assembled the file and added a letter of complaint addressed to the Iowa Utilities Board. The complaint simply asked that Teleconnect be directed to institute appropriate safeguards to ensure that "innocent third parties" would no longer be adversely affected by Teleconnect's arbitrary "blocking" policies. My letter of complaint was dated July 7, 1988 and the Iowa Utilities Board replied on July 13, 1988. The The reply stated that Teleconnect was required to respond to my complaint by August 2, 1988, and the Board would then propose a resolution. If the proposed resolution was not satisfactory, I could request that the file be reopened and the complaint be reconsidered. If the results of that action were not satisfactory, a formal hearing could be requested. After filing the complaint, I also sent a copy of the file to Congressman Tom Tauke. Mr. Tauke represents the Second Congressional District of Iowa, which includes Cedar Rapids, and is also a member of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee. I have subsequently had a personal conversation with Mr. Tauke as well as additional correspondence on the subject. He seems to have a deep and genuine interest in the issue, but at my request, is simply an interested observer at this time. It is our hope that the Iowa Utilities Board will propose an acceptable resolution without additional help. AN UNRESPONSIVE RESPONSE -- Teleconnect's "response" to the Iowa Utilities Board was filed July 29, 1988. As anticipated, it was a mass of vague generalities and unsubstantiated allegations. However, it offered one item of new, and shocking, information; Curt Kyhl's BBS had been blocked for ten months, from June 6, 1987 to mid-April 1988. (At this point it should be noted that Teleconnect's customers had no idea that the company was blocking some of our calls. We just assumed that calls weren't going through because of Teleconnect's technical problems). Teleconnect avoided putting any specific, or even relevant, information in their letter. However, they did offer to whisper in the staff's ear; "Teleconnect would be willing to share detailed information regarding this specific case, and hacking in general, with the Board's staff, as it has in the past with various federal and local law enforcement agencies, including the United States Secret Service. Teleconnect respectfully requests, however, that the board agree to keep such information confidential, as to do otherwise would involve public disclosure of ongoing investigations of criminal conduct and the methods by which interexchange carriers, including Teleconnect, detect such theft." There is no indication of whether anyone felt that such a "confidential" meeting would violate Iowa's Open Meetings Law. Nobody apparently questioned why, during a ten-months long "ongoing investigation," Teleconnect seemed unable to determine the name of the individual whose line they were blocking. Of course, whatever they did was justified because in their own words, "Teleconnect had suffered substantial dollar losses as a result of the theft of long distance services by means of computer 'hacking' utilizing the computer billboard which is available at that number." Teleconnect's most vile allegation was, "Many times, the hacker will enter the stolen authorization code on computer billboards, allowing others to steal long distance services by utilizing the code." But no harm was done by the blocking of the BBS number because, "During the ten month period the number was blocked, Teleconnect received no complaints from anyone claiming to be the party to whom the number was assigned." The fact that Curt Kyhl had no way of knowing his line was being blocked might have had something to do with the fact that he didn't complain. It was also pointed out that I really had no right to complain since, "First, and foremost, Mr. Schmickley is not the subscriber to the number." That is true, I'm just a long-time Teleconnect customer who was refused service because of an alleged act performed by an unknown third party. Then Teleconnect dumped on the Utilities Board staff a copy of a seven page article from Business Week Magazine, entitled "Is Your Computer Secure?" This article was totally unrelated to the theft of long-distance service, except for an excerpt from a sidebar story about a West German hackers' club. The story reported that, "In 1984, Chaos uncovered a security hole in the videotex system that the German telephone authority, the Deutsche Bundespost, was building. When the agency ignored club warnings that messages in a customer's private electronic mailbox weren't secure, Chaos members set out to prove the point. They logged on to computers at Hamburger Sparkasse, a savings bank, and programmed them to make thousands of videotex calls to Chaos headquarters on one weekend. After only two days of this, the bank owed the Bundespost $75,000 in telephone charges." RESOLUTION WITH A RUBBER STAMP -- The staff of the Iowa Utilities Board replied to my complaint by letter on August 19, 1988. They apparently accepted the vague innuendo submitted by Teleconnect without any verification; "Considering the illegal actions reportedly to be taking place on number (319) 236-0834, it appears the blocking was reasonable. However, we believe the Board should be notified shortly after the blocking and permission should be obtained to continue the blocking for any period of time." However, it was also noted that, "Iowa Code 476.20 (1) (1987) states, 'A utility shall not, except in cases of emergency, discontinue, reduce, or impair service to a community or a part of a community, except for nonpayment of account or violation of rules and regulations, unless and until permission to do so is obtained from the Board." The letter further clarified, "Although the Iowa Code is subject to interpretation, it appears to staff that 'emergency' refers to a relatively short time..." CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE -- Since it appeared obvious that the Utilities Board staff had not questioned or investigated a single one of Teleconnect's allegations, the staff's response was absolutely astounding. Accordingly, I filed a request for reconsideration on August 22nd. Three points were raised in the request for reconsideration; (1) The staff's evaluation should have been focused on the denial of service to me and countless others of Teleconnect's 200,000 customers, and not just on the blocking of incoming calls to one BBS. (2) The staff accepted all of Teleconnect's allegations as fact, although not one bit of hard evidence was presented in support of those allegations. (3) In the words of the staff's own citation, it appeared that Teleconnect had violated Iowa Code 476.20 (1) (1987) continuously over a ten months' period, perhaps as long as four years. Since Teleconnect had dumped a seven page irrelevant magazine article on the staff, it seemed only fair to now offer a two page completely relevant story to them. This was "On Your Computer - Bulletin Boards," from the June 1988 issue of "Changing Times." This excellent article cited nine BBSs as "good places to get started." Among the nine listed BBSs was Curt Kyhl's "Stock Exchange, Waterloo, Iowa (319-236-0834)." Even the geniuses at Teleconnect ought to be able to recognize that this BBS, recommended by a national magazine, is the very same one they blocked for ten months. MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE RANCH -- You are now up-to-date on the entire story. Now, we are in the process of spreading the word so that all interested people can contact the Iowa authorities so they will get the message that this case is much bigger than the blocking of one BBS. YOU can help. Read the notice appended to this file and ACT. If you are a Teleconnect customer, it is very important that you write the agencies listed on the notice. If you are not a Teleconnect customer, but are interested in preserving your rights to uninhibited communications, you can help the cause by writing to those agencies, also. Please, people, write now! Before it is too late! - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T E L E C O N N E C T C U S T O M E R S = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = If you are user of Teleconnect's long distance telephone service, you need to be aware of their "blocking" policy: Teleconnect has been "lashing out" against the callers of bulletin boards and other "computer numbers" by blocking access of legitimate subscribers to certain phone numbers to which calls have been made with fraudulent Teleconnect charge numbers. Curt Kyhl's Stock Exchange Bulletin Board in Waterloo has been "blocked" in such a manner. Teleconnect representatives have indicated that other "computer numbers" have been the objects of similar action in the past, and that they (Teleconnect) have a "right" to continue such action in the future. Aside from the trampling of individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, this arbitrary action serves only to "punish the innocent" Teleconnect customers and bulletin board operators, while doing absolutely nothing to identify, punish, or obtain payment from the guilty. The capping irony is that Teleconnect, which advertises as offering significant savings over AT&T long-distance rates, now suggests to complaining customers that the blocked number can still be dialed through AT&T. Please write to Teleconnect. Explain how long you have been a customer, that your modem generates a significant amount of the revenue they collect from you, and that you strongly object to their arbitrarily deciding what numbers you may or may not call. Challenge their "right" to institute a "blocking" policy and insist that the policy be changed. Send your protests to: Teleconnect Company Mr. Dan Rogers, Vice President for Customer Service 500 Second Avenue, S.E. Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401 A complaint filed with the Iowa Utilities Board has been initially resolved in favor of Teleconnect. A request for reconsideration has been filed, and the time is NOW for YOU to write letters to the State of Iowa. Please write NOW to: Mr. Gerald W. Winter, Supervisor, Consumer Services Iowa State Utilities Board Lucas State Office Building Des Moines, Iowa 50319 And to: Mr. James Maret Office of the Consumer Advocate Lucas State Office Building Des Moines, Iowa 50319 Write now. The rights you save WILL be your own. After filing a request for reconsideration of my complaint, I received a reply from the Iowa State Utilities Board which said, in part: "Thank you for your letter dated August 22, 1988, with additional comments concerning your complaint on the blocking of access to certain telephone numbers by Teleconnect. "To ensure that the issues are properly investigated, we are forwarding your comments to the company and requesting a response by September 15, 1988." Again, this is a very large issue. Simply stated; Does ANY telephone company have the right to "block" (or refuse to place) calls to ANY number on the basis of unsubstantiated, uninvestigated charges of "telephone fraud," especially when the alleged fraud was committed by a third party without the knowledge of the called party? In the specific case, the question becomes; Can a long distance carrier refuse to handle calls to a BBS solely because some unknown crook has placed fraudulently-charged calls to that BBS? Incidentally, when you write, please cite file number C-88-161. If you have any additional information which might be helpful in this battle, please let me know. You can send mail to me via U.S. Mail to: Jim Schmickley 7441 Commune Court, N.E. Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52402 (See "On The Edge Of Forever" in PWN XXI/1 for an update on this issue. -KL) ==Phrack Inc.== Volume Two, Issue 21, File 9 of 11 PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Edition PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Phrack World News PWN PWN Special Edition Issue Two PWN PWN PWN PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN PWN by Knight Lightning PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Thanks To Hatchet Molly PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Special Edition PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Ed Schwartz Show on WGN Radio 720 AM ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ September, 27-28, 1988 Transcribed by Hatchet Molly Hello. In this special presentation of Phrack World News, we have the abridged transcripts from the Ed Schwartz Show, a late night talk show broadcast by WGN Radio 720 AM - Chicago, Illinois. The transcripts that appear here in Phrack have been edited for this presentation. For the most part, I have decided to omit the unrelated chatter as well as any comments or discussions that are not pertinent to the intent of Phrack World News. In addition to this, I have also edited the speech somewhat to make it more intelligible, not an easy task. However, the complete unedited version of this broadcast can be found on The Phoenix Project (512)441-3088, sysoped by The Mentor. :Knight Lightning - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Cast; A = Anna (Self-proclaimed phone phreak in Kansas City, Missouri) AA = Sergeant Abagail Abraham (Illinois State Police; Computer Crime Section) B = Bob (A bulletin board system operator) BG = Bob Gates (Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech) CM = Chuck Moran (Director of Internal Affairs; Ameritech Applied Technologies) D = Dan (A computer science major at DeVry Technical Institute in Chicago, IL) ES = Edward Schwartz (Our host) EZ = Ed Zahdi (A researcher from THE READER, a local publication in Chicago) G = Gordon (Hatchet Molly, a graduate student at Northern Illinois University) JM = John F. Maxfield (Our famous friend from BoardScan in Detroit, Michigan) K = Kevin (A BBS sysop) L = Louis (A caller) P = Penny (A victim) R = Robert (A legal hacker) R = Ray (A former software pirate) S = ?? (A consulting engineer) Also mentioned, but not on the show, was SHADOW HAWK of Chicago, Illinois, who was recently arrested for theft of software from AT&T, and TOM TCIMPIDIS, a famous sysop who was arrested for having, unknown to him, AT&T Calling Card numbers on his legal bulletin board. ^*^ ES: It's 12 minutes after the hour. The hour, of course, is eleven o'clock. We have a tremendous amount of commerce that goes on late at night and in the early morning. When I say commerce I'm talking about computer operations of all kind from keypunching to tabulating - you name it. We've done two programs with Ed Zahdi who is the researcher from THE READER (the weekly newspaper) from the "straight dope" column. Ed Zahdi does the research and on two appearances (on two Friday nights) within the last year or so on this program Ed Zahdi has received a number of phone calls... about computer hacking, about people whose telephones mysteriously ring in the middle of the night -- or almost any time of the day but constantly do so and they pick up the phone and there's nobody there. The last time Ed Zahdi was on, we were flooded with calls from people who claimed that; o There are all kinds of telemarketing people who are ringing telephones. o That the phone company is testing phones and you don't know it. o That the phone network gets tested every day and everybody's phone rings once or for half a ring and nobody's ever there. I was amazed at the number and type of calls that came in. We called the phone company and we asked for some cooperation and tonight we are having as guests not only Mr. Ed Zahdi from THE READER, but also Mr. Chuck Moran, the Director of Internal Affairs from Ameritech Applied Technologies. We also have Mr. Bob Gates, Manager of Corporate Security for Ameritech. We're gonna get into this whole thing as to whether or not people are using and abusing the phone networks. Whether or not computer hackers are ferreting out phone numbers with computers. Whether or not you can really program a computer to randomly ring every telephone in the city or not. If you're a computer person hang around. We're also going to talk about some of the things that the phone company and other allied businesses are doing to catch up with the computer hackers. JC: Well, that sounds interesting to me. ES: Well now are you ready for this? The Bureau of Criminal Investigation of the Illinois State Police has a computer fraud unit. JC: Uh-huh ES: And do you know what they like to do? JC: What do they like to do? ES: Lock up computer hackers. Tonight we're going have the computer hackers running for the hills! Well maybe I should say "typing for the hills" huh? JC: Probably! (chuckle) ES: Because they don't run...most of them are couch potatoes. JC: That's right! ES: Glad to see you here Ed. EZ: Glad to be here Ed. In In the "straight dope" we deal with all kinds of questions one of the questions we got onto was the question of ghost rings. People would hear these things primarily at night. ES: On their home phone? EZ: On their home phone. What would happen is that they'd be sitting at home and the telephone would ring for a half a ring or a whole ring or maybe even two rings. They would pick it up and nobody would be there. And I'd heard about this in the past. I thought it was some peculiarity of buying a phone from K-Mart or who knows where. We got easily a dozen calls in the course of the evening from people who had the same experience happen to them. And it would always, oddly enough, happen at the same time of the night or on the same day of the week at the same time of the night and it was pretty eerie. We got one woman, who I've spoken to several times since who said that she was an answering service operator and she had whole banks of phones and sets of these phones would jingle once at a certain time of the night and then the next day a different set would jingle at a certain time of the night and then the following week or the following whenever the pattern would repeat, but nobody was ever there. And so we decided there had to be some obvious solution to this problem and the speculation at the time was that it was some sort of a testing program that the phone company had to check out the trunk lines or something